Fallibilism and Skepticism

Fallibilism is the theory that all claims of knowledge could be mistaken. Extreme fallibilists even argue that absolute certainty about knowledge is impossible. Fallibilism is a major part of pragmatist theory as pragmatists argue the most knowledge can hope to be is functional. While Fallibilism seems compatible with Skepticism there are fundamental differences between the two which depict the two as opposing views.

The main objection Fallibilists have against Skepticism is the Skeptic's impossibly high standards for knowledge. Skeptic says that, "I S knows p, then S is absolutely certain of p", such is The Certainty argument and as absolute certainty is impossible knowledge is impossible and thus claiming all knowledge should be rejected. The Fallibilist, in contrast, holds that knowledge merely requires very good reasons. For example, if you are standing under a tree and the lighting is good, you have no reason not to trust that your eyes are functioning properly, and you have had previous experiences of trees then, while there is some remote chance of error, you have no reason to think you are making an error, but instead excellent reasons to think you are not making an error. The Fallibilist maintains that one cannot know something that is false. If you are in fact not standing under a tree than you do not know that you are.

Skeptics also used the Possibility of Error Argument, that is a belief can be mistaken than it is not a case of knowledge. This is refuted by Fallibilists who argue that the possibility of error is compatible with knowledge. So with the tree example, you believe for excellent reasons that you are standing under a tree, and you actually are, then you have knowledge. If you are the victim of a hallucination or some other funny business and it is not a tree than you do not have knowledge. Such is closely linked to The Certainty Argument as a Skeptic may defend the Possibility of Error Argument as Feldman explains, "If you can be mistaken about something than you are not absolutely certain of it. If you are not absolutely certain than you do not know it. So if you are mistaken about something than you do not know it." However, this is promptly dismissed by Fallibilists as they have no need for absolute certainty in knowledge.

The Skeptics also argue The Introspective Indistinguishably Argument, there cannot be cases of knowledge that are introspectively indistinguishable from cases of nonknowledge, but if knowledge requires good reasons and not perfect reasons then such a theory, according to the Fallibilists is wrong. Skeptics will maintain that just because the reasons are extremely good and not perfect, then there will be other cases in which one's "extremely good" reasons lead to false beliefs and a lack of knowledge. For example if you believe you are standing under a tree because the lighting is good and you have no reason to believe your vision is failing you, but it turns out you are actually standing under a very high quality inflatable palm tree than you have no knowledge. The Skeptics hold that absolute certainty is a mental state which guarantees truth and which are introspectively distinguishable from beliefs which are not certain. Suppose you cannot tell the difference between Boston Terriers and French Bulldogs. Seeing one and seeing the other are to you indistinguishable. Analogously, a skeptic would say that you can never know if you are seeing a real dog or being tricked by a demon, your senses, or whatever into dreaming you are seeing a dog and such a state introspectively indistinguishable from seeing a real dog hence you cannot know that you are seeing a real dog.

A further objection to Fallibilism is the Knowing That You Know Argument which says if fallibilism is true than one can never tell whether or not he has knowledge. Fallibilists avoid this by saying that knowledge about knowledge is like knowledge about other things. If I know I am standing under a tree because I have a justified true belief of standing under a tree then I can have knowledge that I know the fact by having a justified true belief that I know I am standing under a tree. However, both bits of knowledge are fallible. I am not absolutely certain of standing under a tree nor am I absolutely certain for knowing I know I am standing under a tree.