Modest Foundationalism is a diluted form are Cartesian Foundationalism as it attempts to remove itself from the bounds of deduction by considering things such as "There is a chair in the corner" and "It is raining" as justified basic beliefs. Such beliefs are not infallible, but, according to Modest Foundationalists, they are justified. Furthermore, it is with this broader sense of justified basic beliefs that additional beliefs about the external world can be deduced. Although modest foundationalism can be subdivided, in Feldman's Epistemology it is for the most part captured by the principals:
1. Basic beliefs are spontaneously formed beliefs. Typically, beliefs about the external world and inner mental states are justified and basic.
2. A spontaneously formed belief is justified provided it is a proper response to experiences and it is not defeated by other evidence the believer has.
3. Nonbasic beliefs are justified when they are supported by strong inductive inferences from justified basic beliefs.
Of course there are objections, the first being Nothing is Basic. The philosopher, BonJour, argues that basic beliefs must have a Truth Indicative Feature. If you believe your credit card is maxed out it is on the basis of what the credit card company told you, however you then believe the credit card company is telling the truth based on the fact that they have in the past. This support, TIFs. for beliefs, keeps beliefs from ever being basic. Yet, Feldman considers TIFs as extra justification not necessary justification as experiences themselves can directly justify a belief.
The second objection raises questions about proper responses to experiences. Not a direct refutation of Modest Foundationalism, this objection wishes to gain clarification. Why is "There is a chair in the corner" basic while "There is an antique chair in the corner" not basic? As I discussed in my Cartesian Foundationalism post, it all goes back to deduction. To believe something is an antique requires the additional steps of deducing it as different from modern chairs using the experiences one has of modern chairs as well as deducing it as similar to antique chairs based on the experiences one has of antique chairs.
Can you give me an example of a non-basic belief, for an M.F.? (What other beliefs are there besides beliefs about the external world & inner mental states?) [This'll establish Familiarity]
ReplyDeleteI didn't get the TIF argument here - can you explain how they keep beliefs from ever being basic?
[And then, if you can explain a bit more of Feldman's response, and evaluate it, that would address Competence for this objection.]
OK, good examples for the 'proper responses' objection. If it was just deduction, there wouldn't be a big problem here, as deduction is really good, everyone likes it. Let me approach the problem this objection is addressing, in a different way: "There is a chair in the corner" seems to involve the same sorts of deductive steps as the 'antique' version - except maybe one less step. That is: to know about chairs, don't I have to make "the additional steps of deducing it" as different from modern *tables* using my experiences of modern tables as well as deducing it as similar to chairs based on experiences of other chairs? Can you respond to this question as a way of clearly expressing the problem of 'proper responses'? (We're close to Familiarity here, too.)